Hybrid features-based prediction for novel phish websites by Zuhair, H. et al.
 78: 12–3 (2016) 95-109 | www.jurnalteknologi.utm.my | eISSN 2180–3722 | 
 
 
Jurnal 
Teknologi 
 
 
Full Paper 
  
 
  
 
HYBRID FEATURES - BASED PREDICTION 
FOR NOVEL PHISH WEBSITES 
 
Hiba Zuhairab, Mazleena Sallehb*, Ali Selamatbc 
 
aAl-Nahrain University, Baghdad, Iraq 
bFaculty of Computing, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, 
81310, UTM Johor Bahru, Johor, Malaysia 
cCenter of  Communication and Information Technologies 
(CICT), Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, 81310, UTM Johor 
Bahru, Johor, Malaysia 
Article history 
Received  
26 November 2015  
Received in revised form  
14 January 2016  
Accepted  
10 October 2016 
 
*Corresponding author 
mazleena@utm.my 
 
 
 
 
Graphical abstract 
 
 
Abstract 
  
Phishers frequently craft novel deceptions on their websites and circumvent existing anti-
phishing techniques for insecure intrusions, users’ digital identity theft, and then illegal 
profits. This raises the needs to incorporate new features for detecting novel phish websites 
and optimizing the existing anti-phishing techniques. In this light, 58 new hybrid features 
were proposed in this paper and their prediction susceptibilities were evaluated by using 
feature co-occurrence criterion and a baseline machine learning algorithm. Empirical test 
and analysis showed the significant outcomes of the proposed features on detection 
performance. As a result, the most influential features are identified, and new insights are 
offered for further detection improvement.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION  
 
In the last decade, the web data flow has shown a 
rapid expansion of phish websites that practically lure 
targeting users to acquire their own sensitive 
information by masquerading them as a trustworthy 
entity in the web environment. Phish website is a form of 
phishing, where phishers imitate a legitimate website by 
exploiting specific deceptions and innovative social 
tactics for digital identity theft and then monetary gains 
[1-3]. To intuitively tackle phish websites, researchers 
have introduced numerous anti-phishing techniques 
and involved various detection methods such as non-
classification and classification based methods those 
assisted by different features [1-4]. In the literature of 
anti-phishing, the classification based methods 
outperformed the others due to the use of machine 
learning and data mining algorithms. However, there is 
still high false detection errors causing inaccurate 
detection against novel phish website. Phishers often 
evolve novel phish websites exploiting new and more 
sophisticated deceptions to bypass the aforesaid 
detection methods for more insecure intrusions, identity 
theft and illegal profits [4, 5]. Hence, the steady 
escalating of novel phish websites becomes the most 
intricate issue needs to be considered seriously [3, 4, 5].  
For the problem at hand, this paper has made the 
following contributions: (i) this paper proposes new, 
hybrid and predictive features for detecting those 
novel phish websites, (ii) an experimental strategy has 
been conducted by using an optimized assessment 
criterion in order to identify features’ prediction 
susceptibility and analyse features’ influence on 
detection performance. More precisely, the proposed 
features encompasses a hybridity of web page content 
and web page URL features.   
Furthermore, they leveraged the most dynamic 
attributes that phishers could use to impersonate their 
targeting legitimate websites such as those of 
embedded objects, cross site scripting, and those 
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crafted in URLs hosting non-English webpages. It is 
hoped that contributions has been made by this paper 
would help researchers in the field of phishing mitigation 
with a great knowledge and understanding about the 
causality between the features proposed herewith, 
their prediction potentials, and the overall detection 
performance on novel phish websites as well as those 
prevalent ones.  
The remaining sections of this paper are as follows: 
Section 2 presents a background of phishing and anti-
phishing, commonly used features along with related 
works. Section 3 states the developed methodology 
that pursued in this work. Then, Section 4 presents the 
dedicated experimental strategy, the experimental 
dataset, and the results along with a deep discussion 
and comparative analysis. Also, it synthesizes several 
implications for future work. Section 5 outlooks on the 
proposed features and developed classification 
methodology, draws conclusions.  
 
 
1.1  The State-of-The-Art 
 
1.1.1 Phishing and Anti-Phishing  
 
It is well known that phishing is a form of online fraud to 
acquire the Internet users’ confidential and personal 
information through the identification theft for financial 
gains. Typically, the phishers accomplish this fraudulent 
process in a strategic manner with the aid of a spoofed 
email or fake website along with a social engineering 
tactic [6]. According [7] a phish website is any web 
page that impersonates illegally a trustworthy website 
and it is crafted on the behalf of a third party (phisher) 
who intends to confuse users and acquire their 
credentials for fraud activity and illegal profits. Radical 
escalating of phish websites on the Web causes direct 
losses (e.g. financial loss and identity theft) to the users 
and enterprises and indirect losses (e,g. impacts on 
customer’s trust in an online service, or e-banking 
transaction, or reputation of a financial organization 
and brand). To this end, many researchers have 
applied different anti-phishing techniques to combat 
phishing activities and mitigate their damages 
particularly over the last few years. Researchers’ 
developments varied in their deployments including 
detection methods, features and information sources. 
To give an insight on such detective methods, they 
were categorized into non-classification and 
classification based methods, and each category was 
decomposed into sub-categories such as blacklist and 
whitelist methods, machine learning classifiers and data 
mining methods, hybrid, and information-flow methods 
[8, 9, 10]. Among all the aforesaid categories and sub-
categories, the classification methods outperform their 
competitors due to the integration of features and 
machine learning classifiers or data mining rules to build 
effective phishing classification models. Therefore, 
researchers continually develop their achievements 
with the aid of classification methods by optimizing their 
inductive bias and extending the features in use 
towards obtaining a holistic characterization on 
phishing deceptions with minimal detection errors.   
 
1.1.2  Phishing Deceptive Features 
 
In the light of classification methods, prior researchers 
have deployed different types of features for phishing 
detection on websites. Deployed features were varied 
from static to dynamic features due to their nature and 
the source of extraction. Static features can be 
extracted from the webpage source and URL without 
full execution of the web page itself. Whereas, dynamic 
features can be retrieved during the webpage source 
rendering and execution [8, 9, 10].  
Consequently, the deployed features have made 
different discriminative contributions at predicting 
phishing susceptibility. Some feature might being non-
informative and irrelevant to phishing class, and then 
they might negatively influence the overall 
effectiveness of classification method [11]. That is the 
most intricate issue encountered with the utilization of 
classification based methods. On the other hand, 
phishers often advance their deceptions and exploit 
more innovative ones to bypass the existing anti-
phishing campaigns. Example of such evolutionary 
features are those of specific embedded and dynamic 
objects, host files, domain names and top level 
domains, and cross site scripting codes. Phishers craft 
such kinds of features on websites to inject malicious 
codes, harvest passwords, and redirect the visiting users 
to fake websites. Moreover, advancement of phishers’ 
deceptions involved exploiting URLs of trustworthy 
websites hosting with different natural languages rather 
than English [2, 11-13]. As such, they are being able to 
evade anti-phishing techniques relied on textual 
features exclusively. As a result, the aforesaid 
evolutionary types of features yield misclassification 
costs, and then more potential security risks and 
monetary losses. Day after day, evolutionary features 
become the key challenge versus effective anti-
phishing techniques assisted by machine learning 
methods [11, 14, 15]. Such challenge is emerged as the 
most salient research agenda which demands 
persistent exploration of new deployments to promote 
existing generations of features. Beyond this, it is 
essential to find out highly discriminative features for 
accurate classification on phish and non-phish web 
sites. Examples of evolutionary features that have been 
deployed in the literature are categorized and 
displayed in Figure 1. Also, the relevant issues of each 
feature category is depicted briefly in Table 1. 
 
1.1.3  Related Work 
 
Classification based detection methods were 
developed for intuitive filtering and protection against 
phish websites, therefore, they were heavily applied to 
the client-side level in between the interaction of users 
with web environment. In this context, Table 2 enlists 
examples of such client side filters along with their 
relative merits and demerits.
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Figure 1 Categories of phishing features as they adopted in [3, 6-9, 11, 16-32] 
 
Table 1 Comparison of different feature categories 
 
Feature Category Advantage Disadvantage 
Webpage Content 
features 
Comprehensiveness & widely usage  Challenge of obfuscation, code coverage, malicious 
code injection and delivery 
URL features Easy extraction & widely usage  Challenge of phish detection with high sensitivity,  
Online features Easy extraction Limited usage and requirement of external resources  
Hybrid features High comprehensiveness Complex extraction process and requirements 
 
 
Table 2 Characterization of related work with respect to their leveraging of novel features 
 
Related 
Work 
Brief Description XSS Features Embedded Objects 
Features  
Language 
 Independent Features  
 [6] It classifies phishing emails and webpages using 
classifier and Google’s blacklist 
No No No 
 [16] Utilize DOM tree objects, HTTP transactions and some 
webpage components to detect phishes  
No No Yes  
 [17] It Submits fake credentials before and after actual 
user’s credentials. 
Yes  No Yes 
 [18] It identifies phishing websites by using Bayesian filter 
and DOM tree. 
No No Yes  
 [19] It sends bogus credentials when a webpage is 
detected as phishing to avoid information leakage. 
No  No Yes 
 [9, 20] Identifies phishing websites by using FSM and several 
features. 
Yes No Yes 
 [21] It maintains blacklist of phishing URLs using TLD and DNs 
features 
No No Yes 
 [22] It is based on both lookup and a SVM classifier that 
checks features derived from websites URL, text and 
linkage. 
No No No 
 [23] Extract features of webpage identity and compare 
them with the current domain using search engine. 
No No No 
 [25] It utilizes recorded legitimate URLs in a whitelist and 
Bayesian algorithm to verify URL’s legitimacy  
Yes No Yes 
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Regarding Table 2, a hybrid based anti-phishing tool, 
Google Toolbar, was presented to incorporate an 
upgraded Google phishing blacklist with a machine 
learning classifier [7]. In [16], phishing filtering was 
devoted using textual and DOM objects features 
alongside Support Vector machine classifier (SVM). 
Two key components are involved in filtering, they are 
information retrieval algorithm to extract textual 
features and Chi-squared criterion to select the most 
discriminative ones. Another example is PhishGuard 
[17], it was asserted to keep track users’ submissions 
and their bogus credentials during login activities. 
Meanwhile, B-APT [18], was adopted to filter websites 
of US financial institutions exclusively. It relied on 
Bayesian filter and a whitelist of examining tokens and 
objects to identify phishing websites. Later, Bogus Bitter 
was developed by [19] to deliver a plenty of bogus 
credentials along with those actual ones as a way to 
keep track phish websites. Whereas, PhishTester was 
developed to mitigate cross site scripting phish attacks 
exclusively by exploiting vulnerabilities in web browsers 
and detecting suspicious codes through the flow of 
information [9, 20]. In contrast, PhishNet was attained 
in [21] as an upgraded blacklist with a classifier and 
new URL features in order to proof-check whether an 
examined URL useful for resolving DNS lookup. Then, 
an evolutionary hybrid anti-phishing tool (PhishBlock) 
was developed and introduced in [22] for classifying 
the phishness of URL and textual features extracted 
from examined websites. Meanwhile, CANTINA+ was 
proposed by some researchers working at Carnegie 
Mellon University as an extensible CANTINA with extra 
discriminative features. CANTINA+ was developed to 
involve an information flow mechanism along with 
machine learning classifiers for better filtering on novel 
phishing attacks [23]. Whereas, AIWL was an 
automated individual whitelist built in browsers to 
protect users during online transaction [24].  
 Overall the aforesaid phishing filters, have several 
outstanding issues in leveraging evolving phish 
websites particularly those crafted with cross site 
scripting (XSS) features, embedded objects based 
features, and newly exploited URLs of non-English 
hosted webpages (Table 2). Therefore, further efforts 
should be dedicated to explore new features with 
high prediction susceptibility for holistic 
characterization and accurate classification on novel 
phishes. This, in turn, will improve the effectiveness of 
existing anti-phishing techniques with minimal 
computations, misclassification cost, false alarms, and 
performance overhead.  
 
2.0  METHODOLOGY 
 
This section articulates the solution to the problems at 
hand through four steps, website analysis, features 
extraction, features assessment and phishing 
classification. 
 
 
 
2.1  Website Analysis 
 
To extract a hybrid set of features from web page 
content and URL, the relevant components and parts 
in the web page source code were parsed, and a 
Document Object Model (DOM) tree was constructed 
as the node-based representation of the examined 
web page. In fact, Document Object Model (DOM) is 
a standard platform of the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) that allows dynamical access to 
the webpage’s content, structure and style by 
programs and scripts [34]. DOM tree includes nodes 
denoting different components of the webpage that 
they could be rendered as a rooted tree with nodes, 
and each node represents a constituent tag [34]. By 
this way, all components, elements, attributes and 
textual parts are represented by the leaf nodes of 
DOM tree.  
The webpage source code represents the 
starting node or the root of DOM tree, and then the 
DOM tree continues to extend its branches to the 
lowest level, where all the leaf nodes exist (Figure 2). 
Then, the constructed DOM tree is treated as a graph 
G (V, E) in which any two vertices are connected by 
exactly one path in order to extract the wanted 
features [33-35]. The set of vertices in the graph 
represents the set of nodes in the DOM tree signifying 
the set of tags in the webpage source code. 
To extract URL features, the webpage URL was 
tokenized into terms including lexical features, tokens, 
specific irregularities and structural elements. To 
retrieve the required features during the tokenization 
process, the classic TF-IDF metric was used as per 
Equation (1) [25]:  
 
𝑡𝑓 − 𝑖𝑑𝑓(𝑤) = 𝑡𝑓(𝑤) · 𝑖𝑑𝑓(𝑤)                                (1)  
 
Where term frequency tf(w) indicates the count of 
occurrences of w in the webpage, inverse 
document frequency idf(w) represents the general 
importance of w in the whole collection and w is the 
term in query.  
Then, a feature vector was generated so that each 
webpage𝑉𝑗, a vector of multiple features 𝑉𝑗 =
{𝑉𝑗,1, … , 𝑉𝑗.|𝑉𝑗|} where|𝑉𝑗|, is the total number of 
extracted features from that webpage. Each feature 
𝑉𝑗,𝑖  returned either a binary value or a numeric value.  
The binary values are computed as the union of their 
corresponding feature’s values, while the numeric 
features in their values are combined by taking the 
average value of the corresponding features. Finally, 
the obtained feature vectors were combined into a 
multi-dimensional vector (Feature Matrix) to include 
all the extracted feature vectors corresponding to all 
web pages in the training set. Also, the 
corresponding webpage class label (phish or non-
phish) was set in the first column of each row in the 
feature matrix.  
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2.2  Features Extraction  
 
Novel deceptive features may rely highly on some 
embedded components and scripts in the webpage’ 
source code as well as lexical and structural token in 
the webpage URL address [11, 14, 20, 23]. Thus, these 
features are categorized based on the parts from 
where they can be extracted as explained below: 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 2 Example of webpage presentation (a) the browser 
view, (b) HTML view and (c) view of related DOM tree 
 
 
A. Embedded objects and features: specific 
components with their objects and attributes 
exist inside their relative HTML parts and tags. 
They can be exploited by phishers for their 
powerful functionality to imitate the webpage 
content, insert and hide forged content and 
external links for redirection to fake websites. 
Furthermore, phishers make these objects 
invisible to avoid phish detection mechanisms 
that leverage traditional webpage content 
features rather than these features (Table 3) [25, 
26].  
B. Cross site scripting (XSS) features: they are 
exploited by phishers as a type of deceptions 
that enables them to hide, inject and deliver 
doubtful and malicious scripts to the client side 
by using client side scripting languages. Further, 
they are exploited to defeat existing anti-
phishing techniques aiming at severe security 
risks because they can be interpreted by web 
browsers [9, 20, 27]. Basically, most of these 
features can be extracted from script tags 
involving code pieces, calls and their events, 
and the native JavaScript functions, etc. (Table 
3). 
C. Language independent features: phishers 
usually use certain features and modification on 
URLs to host phish websites that imitate 
legitimate ones. Regarding the literature, it is 
very common for potential phishing URLs to 
contain terms, irregularities, and indicators that 
have been used for estimating phishing 
susceptibility in websites [28-31] as presented in 
Table 3.  
 
 
Table 3 Characterization of proposed features in terms of 
their relevant categories, sub-categories and extraction 
sources 
 
Feature  
 
Feature  
Category (S) 
Feature 
Subcategory (S)  
Extraction  
Source  
Embedded 
objects 
based 
features 
Webpage 
Content 
Linkage, 
Structural, and 
Source Code 
DOM 
Components, 
HTML Tags, 
Body Text, I/O 
functions, 
Hyperlinks, 
In/Out Links 
XSS-based 
features 
Webpage 
Content 
Source code JavaScript code 
Language 
independ
ent 
features 
URL & Online 
Features 
Structural and 
Lexical features 
IP address, 
Hostname, 
RURAL 
anchors, 
Domain & 
Address 
Indicators 
 
2.3  Features Assessment  
 
To assess the prediction susceptibility of the proposed 
features, co-occurrence criterion was computed. The 
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co-occurrence calculation relies on an optimized 
equation of that adopted in [16]. Assume that ∀𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 
and ∀ 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷. 𝐶𝑓,𝑑 is set as the number of occurrences 
of f in d and 𝐶𝑓,𝐷 is set as the number of occurrence of 
each f in D, where D is the set of all the examined 
instances and F is the set of features belonging to each 
instance d in D. Then, the co-occurrence calculation 
is defined as per Equation (2) [32]: 
 
𝐶𝑓,𝐷 = ∑ 𝐶𝑓,𝑑𝑑∈𝐷    (2) 
 
In the case of our study, novel phishing features 
could belong to valid phish and not valid phish 
(suspicious) web pages rather than phish web pages 
exclusively.  Hence, we re-present the aforesaid 
criterion in terms of valid phish, (D) and not valid 
phish (D'). then, the co-occurrence value of each 
extracted feature f is computed as follows:  
 
𝐶𝑓 =  
𝐶𝑓,𝐷−𝐶𝑓,𝐷′
𝐶𝑓,𝐷+𝐶𝑓,𝐷′
       (3) 
 
Where 𝐷, 𝐷′, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓 are the occurrence of each 
feature f belongs to feature vector F in all instances 
that included in D and D'. Cf, D  and Cf, D' denote the 
co-occurrence values of feature f with respect to all 
instances in D, and the occurrence of feature f with 
respect to all instances in D'. Then, Cf is the 
accumulative co-occurrence of   Cf, D and Cf, D'. 
 
2.4  Phishing Classification 
 
SVM classifier is the most commonly used machine 
learning classifier to obtain the optimal separating 
hyper plane between two classes [35-37]. It 
guarantees the lowest level of error rate because of its 
generalization ability and handling of high 
dimensional feature space. SVM classifier produces 
two output classes [35-37] represented by two labels 
(+1) and (-1) to induct the class of a given feature 
vector whether it is phishing or not phishing.  
To do so, V is a feature matrix denotes all the 
webpages in the learning dataset such that 𝑉 =
{𝑉1 𝑉𝑗 𝑉|𝑉|} and Vj is the feature vector of each 
webpage as  𝑉𝑗 =  {
𝑣𝑗,1 𝑣𝑗,𝑖 𝑣𝑗,|𝑉𝑗|}, where  |𝑉| and |𝑉𝑗| 
are the number of feature vectors and features in 
each feature vector, respectively. Then, 𝑣𝑗,𝑖 is the 
value of each ith feature of jth feature vector Vj, where 
0 ≤ 𝑣𝑗,𝑖 ≤ 1, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, … , |𝑉𝑗| and 𝑗 = 1,2 ,3 , … , |𝑉|, given 
that 𝑉 =  {𝑉𝑗}𝑗=1
|𝑉|
 is a set of |𝑉| training feature vectors 
or alternatively the M-dimensional feature matrix. 
Each Vj is labelled by 𝑦𝑗 ∈ {1, −1} with 𝑦𝑗 = 1 and 𝑦𝑗 =
−1 which indicates the membership of Vj in the (class 
1) and (class 2) as per Equation (4) [36, 37]. 
 
𝑓(𝑥) =  ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝛾𝑗𝐾(𝑉′, 𝑉𝑗) + 𝑏𝑗       (4) 
 
Where 𝛼𝑖 and b are obtained by a quadratic 
algorithm, V′ is the unlabeled webpage and 𝑉𝑗 is the 
feature vector of a training webpage. The function 
𝐾(𝑉′, 𝑉𝑗) maps the space of input webpage to higher 
dimensions where training webpages in the dataset 
are learned individually. As such, the classifier 
assessed the relevance of the input feature 
established an inductive function Y = f(V, γ) to induct 
its class as either phish or legitimate.  
After applying the induction function on all 
feature vectors included F during the training task, a 
feature base classifier was obtained for further 
classification on a given tested web page during the 
testing task. Features were extracted from the 
incoming webpage and being represented as a 
feature vector Vnew. Then, it was learnt with feature 
base classifier to produce its class label 𝑉𝑛𝑒𝑤
′  as either 
phish or legitimate [35-37]. Typically, an illustration of 
the overall classification scenario which adopted 
from [35-37] is presented in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3 Typical Classification scenario with Training and 
Testing tasks as adopted in [35-37]) 
 
 
2.5  Evaluation Metrics 
 
To demonstrate the outcomes of the proposed 
features and their categories to phish website 
detection performance, some primarily used metrics in 
the domain of phishing detection are utilized as they 
presented herewith. These metrics include TP, FP, FN, 
Precision, Recall, F1-measure. True Positive (TP) 
indicates the rate of correctly classified phish 
instances. The False Positive (FP) refers to the rate 
legitimate instances wrongly classified as the phishing 
ones. Whereas False Negative (FN) indicates the phish 
instances wrongly labeled as the legitimate ones. 
Each of the Precision, Recall and F-measure were 
computed through the parameters of TP, FP and FN as 
per Equations 5, 6 and 7, respectively. The maximal 
value of Precision shows the maximal positive 
webpages that were classified. Whilst the maximal 
Recall value denotes the minimal prediction error. 
Then, F-measure was used to compute the mean 
value of both measures and denotes the initial 
phishness indication of the extracted features [33-37] 
as follows:  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
|𝑇𝑃|
|𝑇𝑃|+|𝐹𝑃|
  (5) 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =  
|𝑇𝑃|
|𝑇𝑃|+|𝐹𝑁|
   (6) 
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𝐹 − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 =  2⨉
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜⨉𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛+𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
 (7) 
 
 
3.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The main aim of any hybrid anti-phishing technique 
is to explore more sophisticated features, propose 
predictive ones, and deploy them for distinguishing 
phish and legitimate websites. To this end, this section 
presents the strategy that this research pursued to 
extract, classify and assess the proposed features as 
illustrated in Figure 4. Two main steps were followed: 
features extraction step, and phishness induction 
step. In between, an assessment step was included 
to assess the extracted features with respect to their 
prediction susceptibility for phishing classification 
using co-occurrence criterion and machine learning 
classifier on the experimental dataset.  
Features extraction step deals with analysing 
the website content to extract the wanted features 
from the relevant parts and components of any input 
website as aforesaid in Section 3.0 (Table 3). While, 
phishness induction step, applies the machine 
learning classifier (SVM) to learn the given feature 
matrix. This could approve the decision on whether 
the newly extracted hybrid features are able to 
distinguish the input websites as a novel or legitimate 
phish. Mainly, most of anti-phishing techniques as 
those were discussed here were trying to map an 
input web data to an output data using a specific 
induction rules. Experimentally, the most publically 
known machine learning and data mining tool WEKA 
from the Waikato Environment for Knowledge 
Analysis (WEKA) was utilized to apply SVM classifier. 
 
3.1  Experimental Dataset 
 
Generally, a preliminary set webpages including 
16000 webpages of different exploits with 9600 living 
phish and 6400 legitimate webpages. Webpages 
were collected during 1st September 2015 and 1st 
November 2016 from different sources. All webpages 
were retrieved from three publically available data 
repositories; Phish Tank and Castle Cops (for valid 
phish and non-valid phish web pages), and Alexa’s 
top sites archive (for legitimate web pages).  Such 
data sources were commonly used in the literature 
due to some reasons. In PhishTank, the novel phish 
websites were reported periodically, but some of 
them were inaccessible once their short life span was 
expired.  
Whereas, phish webpages reported by 
CastleCops archive included old and novel phishes 
whose source code files could be accessible and 
rendered [6, 24]. Also, some non-valid phish web 
pages were retrieved from datasets adopted in 
recently published works [16-24]. This is due to their 
possibility to encompass novel phish variants since 
the referring related works stated that they were 
classified as suspicious web pages (Yet, not 
validated as phishes).  
Particularly, as enlisted in Table 4, the 
collected webpages involved imbalanced volumes 
of phish to non-phish webpages. Also, they varied in 
terms of their exploits like login forms, homepages, 
end-up web pages, redirecting web pages. The 
collected web pages involved those hosted in URLs 
of Chinese and French websites with Chinese and 
French languages as well as those in English 
language. Moreover, the collected web pages 
involve those of the most targeting industries by 
phishers such as financial organizations, retail 
services, payments services, governmental 
organizations and social networking.  
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Figure 4 Experimental strategy 
3.2  Experimental Results 
 
All the extracted hybrid features are enlisted in 
Appendix A in terms of their indexes, categories and 
values. The extracted features with their indexes were 
later used in the assessment of prediction 
susceptibility, and the novel phishness induction and  
its performance assessment. Extracted features are 
assessed in the form of their co-occurrence over the 
experimental collection of web pages (dataset). It is 
revealed that a feature of high co-occurrence score 
is expected to be crafted as novel phish feature.  
 
Table 4 Description of experimental dataset 
 
Web page Category Web page 
Collection 
Total number of instances 16000 
Total number of non-phish instances 6400 
Total number of phish instances 9600 
Percentage of login form instances 33% 
Percentage of redirecting instances 40% 
Percentage of homepage instances 18% 
Percentage of end up instances 9% 
Percentage of English instances 90% 
Percentage of French instances 2.67% 
Percentage of Chinese instances 6.24% 
Percentage of financial organization 34.4% 
Percentage of payment services 32.1% 
Percentage of retail services 15.1% 
Percentage of social networking 11.2% 
Percentage of governmental instances 4.6% 
 
Co-occurrence scores of extracted features are 
enlisted in Table 5 along with their relevant features 
that were indexed (from F1 to F58) and categorized 
into three feature groups: Group1 for embedded 
objects category, Group2 for XSS category, and 
Group 3 for language independent features. Figure 5 
plots the trendline of all features along with their 
relevant groups to showcase the diversity of their 
frequency over the experimental dataset.  
On the other hand, the extracted features showed 
up divergent contributions in the form of their 
classification potentials such that each feature 
group showed particular classification rates on the 
experimental dataset. Moreover, all features of the 
examined groups are compacted to the group of 
hybrid features (Group 4) which was also learnt over 
the experimental dataset. This experiment was 
conducted to investigate the discriminating power 
of Group4 and whether it may surpass its competitors 
in phishing classification. Experimental results are 
plotted in graphs of Figures 6 and 7.  
 
3.3  Discussion  
 
Co-occurrence scores of examined features as 
presented in Table 5, and their variations as clearly 
shown in Figure 5, inferred the following observations:  
 
i. F1 (Number of Scripting.FileSystemObject) in 
Group 1 (embedded objects-based features) 
implies counting the frequent use of an object, 
which executes the file system input and output 
on the user’s computer. This object can be 
exploited by the phishers to control downloading 
and uploading the files to and from the computer 
during browsing and then distribute cookie files to 
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the user’s computer. Imitation and use of this 
feature has been highly occurred in both phish 
and suspicious websites so that it can be 
considered as the most significant feature for the 
novel phish detection. On the other hand, F24 is 
the feature with low occurrence rate in Group 1 
(the number of out links), which implies it is highly 
occurring either in the phish websites or in the 
suspicious websites. However, its significance 
should be taken into account for further 
investigation to find whether or not it can be used 
to predict phishness through its combination with 
other features in one set.   
 
Table 5 Counted occurrence of features due to their indexes 
and groups 
 
Group1 Group2 Group3 
Index Value Index Value Index Value 
F1 0.8844 F1 0.63628 F1 0.962 
F2 0.88295 F2 0.67426 F2 0.623 
F3 0.87726 F3 0.75251 F3 0.453 
F4 0.75251 F4 0.6228 F4 0.822 
F5 0.73466 F5 0.7251 F5 0.562 
F6 0.68119 F6 0.7234 F6 0.6211 
F7 0.68107 F7 0.6418 F7 0.6331 
F8 0.73436 F8 0.64778 F8 0.254 
F9 0.6391 F9 0.63672 F9 0.7823 
F10 0.64778 F10 0.6367 F10 0.6372 
F11 0.64283 F11 0.64023 
F12 0.67426 F12 0.63951 
F13 0.66862 F13 0.63871 
F14 0.65541 F14 0.63744 
F15 0.64137 F15 0.63679 
F16 0.64023 F16 0.637093 
F17 0.71111 F17 0.63727 
F18 0.67369 F18 0.63675 
F19 0.65661 F19 0.63841 
F20 0.69789 F20 0.6382 
F21 0.6928 F21 0.6364 
F22 0.6605 F22 0.63639 
F23 0.64023 F23 0.63635 
F24 0.6341 F24 0.63732 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Prediction susceptibility of features with respect to their co-occurrence values over the experimental dataset 
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Figure 6: Phishness induction of feature categories: (a) 
FP and FN, and (b) TP; where Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 refer 
to embedded objects features, XSS based features, 
language independent features and hybrid features, 
respectively  
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Figure 7 Detection performance of feature categories; 
where Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 denote embedded objects 
features, XSS based features, language independent 
features and hybrid features, respectively 
 
ii. Over the three investigated groups of features, 
Groups 1 includes features with higher 
occurrence rate than those in other groups. This 
implies that presence of some features in Group 1 
is highly important for further investigation as a 
deceptive feature that might be exploited in 
novel phishes. This is due to the fact that most of 
the targets of phishes are website logins, which 
enable the phishers to acquire the user’s 
credentials. 
iii. These websites may deploy the embedded 
objects, scripts and components to develop 
replicas of the legitimate websites and redirect 
their visitors to the fake websites by including 
external links and modifying some attributes to the 
input passwords. In addition, they may be used to 
download suspicious files, codes and cookies 
from the Internet, executing ActiveX controls as a 
class ID of some built-in objects, executing shell 
instructions during web browsing, compromising 
webpages and redirecting users to the exploited 
servers.  
iv. Some features included in Group 2 have high 
occurrence rate, which implies that phishes can 
exploit them to inject packed and obfuscated 
scripts using a client side scripting language, such 
as the JavaScript. For example, F3 in Group 2 can 
be exploited to inject loops that execute decode 
routines. Whereas the other features in the same 
group have somewhat less high values than those 
of the highest features. Thus, these features might 
be suggested as significant features to detect 
novel phishes.  
v. Among all the extracted hybrid features, features 
F1, F2 and F3 in Group 1; F3, F5 and F6 in Group 2, 
and F1, F4 and F9 in Group 3 are the most 
occurring features. The second most occurring 
features are F8, F17, F20, F21, F2, F1, F7, F2, F6 and 
F7 from Groups 1, 2 and 3, respectively. But 
features F10, F15, F3 and F8 in Groups 1 and 2 are 
the least significant. This indicates that phishes 
and suspicious websites tend to contain the most 
occurring features, which are mostly non-
traditional features. Thus, such features can be 
considered as novel features that are important 
for the novel phish prediction. These features 
need further investigation and evaluation to 
generate novel phish profile which could be done 
as the next research work.   
vi. The rest of extracted features in Group 2 are 
mostly equal in occurrence and their occurrence 
probabilities tend to be more significant than 
those of the other groups, i.e. values of features 
occurrence in Groups 1 and 3 varied from 0.2 to 
0.9. That implies the majority of the novel phishes 
may exploit these features for much sense, 
trickery and functionality. 
vii. For the features in Group 3, it is obvious that 
phishes and suspicious websites tend to do some 
modifications in the URL’s domain name with TLDs, 
dots and encoded domain names to imitate URLs 
of the legitimate websites. These features usually 
exist in most of the phishes and suspicious 
websites. Furthermore, Group 3 includes less 
number of features with different occurrence 
rates. Features such as F1 (Multiple TLD), F4 
(Coded URL) and F9 (Number of dots in URL) have 
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the highest rate of occurrence, because they 
can be used to refer to domains that serve the 
fake websites. 
 
On the other hand, statistics and charts plotted in 
Figures 6 and 7, revealed the following observations: 
  
i. Due to the low rate of TP and the high rates of 
FP and FN, features of Group 3 achieved the 
least F-measure value among all the examined 
groups of features. This implies that the rate of 
missing phish URLs increased up to 21.97%, 
because the phishers exploit legitimate URLs to 
upload their novel phish websites. Thus, sole use 
of the features in Group 3 is insufficient to 
leverage features of the novel phishes.  
ii. Features of Group 1 were the most contributing 
features due to their F-measure value, which 
denotes their effectiveness in prediction. Group 
2 composed of features with less contribution 
than those of Group 1, whereas the URL 
features of Group 3 had the least contributions.  
iii. Features in Group 1 achieved higher prediction 
accuracy (i.e. F-measure) with relatively 
minimum rate of FP and FN. This infers that these 
feature types could be improved towards 
ranking their detection capability against the 
novel phishes to decrease both FP and FN. 
However, in practice, it is hard to perfectly 
predict novel phishness based on one type of 
feature, which may be the result of impure 
analysis of features exploited by all the novel 
phish websites.   
iv. Combining all the extracted features in Group 
4 reveals that they could increase the 
prediction accuracy without compromising the 
rates of FP and FN. The reasonable rate of FP 
and FN was achieved due to the use of multiple 
types of features that did not entirely overlap. 
Furthermore, the prediction accuracy could be 
improved by filtering all of these features into a 
subset of features that were fewer in number 
and the highest in relevance to the novel 
phishness indication. 
v. Overall, results demonstrate the potential 
discrimination and holistic characterization that 
a large scale set of hybrid features could afford 
to outfit novel and prevalent phish website 
classification  
 
In short, the aforesaid observations implied that 
despite of their frequently occurrence over the 
experimental dataset, examined features are varied 
in their co-occurrence values.  Therefore, those 
investigated features should be taken into account in 
the classification of novel phish websites because 
they may be crafted in phish websites frequently for 
deception purpose in the future case of web data.  
 
 
 
3.4  Comparative Analysis 
 
Some related works adopted different sets of generic 
phishing features to detect phish websites but their 
proposal did not contribute well to novel phishness 
prediction. To restate the difference in features and 
their classification outcomes between our work and 
some of the most renowned related works, Table 6 
gives an overview of the previously used features and 
the proposed ones with respect to the number of 
features, and their categories.  Regarding Table 6, it is 
observed that fewer and more different phishing 
features were investigated by the comparable works 
[11, 22, 23] in contrast to features proposed in this 
paper. In [11, 22, 23], the generic features were 
normally extracted from the URLs and HTML 
documents or the sources codes of the phish 
webpages. Moreover, 3rd party features are also used 
as supplementary features to determine discrepancies 
between the phish and legitimate websites with the 
aid of external resources and search engines for page 
ranking, verification of domain name systems (DNSs), 
and target website identification (WHOIS). Such 
features may not contribute the characterization of 
novel phish website due to their inconsistencies, 
computational costs, and their evasion by novel 
phishes.  
 
Table 6 Comparison overview between this work and the 
related works in the form of deployed features 
 
Feature type [11] [22] [23] This 
work 
HTML 2 8 5 24 
JavaScript 0 0 0 24 
URL 10 9 7 10 
3rd Party 3 1 3 0 
Total 15 18 15 58 
 
 
Regarding Table 6, the authors in [11] used two HTML 
features extracted from the input and login form as 
well as ten URL features with three features related to 
the third parties (e.g. WHOIS and Google page rank). 
In [22], nine URL features and eight HTML features were 
extracted from the title, image, input and text tags. 
They were used with one page rank feature by Google 
search engine. On the other hand, researchers in [23] 
proposed five HTML features, such as those related to 
the input and login forms, seven URL features related 
to patterns, symbols, number of dots, sensitive words, 
IP address and multiple TLDs as well as those extracted 
using the page rank of search engine as the third party 
features. Whereas, this work particularly identified 58 
hybrid features extracted from the nodes of DOM tree 
and they include some native functions, attachment 
events, methods, attributes and other elements 
related to the embedded components and scripts in-
lines of the website’s source codes.  
With the perspective of phishing classification 
outcomes, an assessment was attained across the 
experimental dataset by using our proposed features 
106                            Hiba Zuhair, Mazleena Salleh, & Ali Selamat / (Sciences & Engineering) 78: 12–3 (2016) 95-109 
 
 
and those used in the aforesaid comparable works as 
shown in Figure 8. Figure 8 plots the classification 
outcomes in terms of the rates of false positive (FPR) 
and false negative (FNR) as well as true positive rate 
(TPR). Also, the classification outcomes are reported 
across the experimental dataset which was divided 
into three datasets: Dataset1 for training, Dataset2 for 
validating and Dataset3 for testing.  
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Figure 8 phishing classification outcomes of the 
proposed hybrid set of features versus the features sets 
adopted by the comparable works 
 
 
Results plotted in Figure 8, showcase that the 
proposed features in this work achieved the best 
cases of TPR, FPR and FNR in contrast to those features 
adopted in [11, 22, 23]. This is due to their large 
number, their newly deployment, and their hybridity 
which attained more holistic prediction on almost 
phish websites on the experimental dataset. Indeed, 
more sophisticated features of hybrid feature 
category such as embedded objects features, XSS 
based features, and language independent features 
could successfully classify novel phish web websites. 
Despite the proposed hybrid set of features, the 
features set adopted in [11] reported lower TP with 
higher FP and FN because of its smaller number of 
features. Moreover, such features have less 
divergence with respect to their types and features 
particular categories that might fall short to detect 
novel phishes effectively on the dataset. Besides, the 
experimental dataset is of imbalanced class 
distribution in phishing and legitimate websites so that 
new phishing deceptions can be misclassified. 
Therefore, the features set of [11] lacked adaptation 
to novel phish websites. Whereas, the features set that 
adopted in [22], maintained a relatively noticeable 
rise due to their partial classification of phish websites 
across the datasets that varied in their class distribution 
and web page exploits. However, their results 
revealed their inability to characterize more 
advanced phishing deceptions. Similarly, features 
adopted by Xiang et al. [23] yielded the worst case of 
classification performance across the datasets 
amongst those of other related works. Such 
unacceptable classification outcomes among the 
others pointed out the partial characterization of the 
aforesaid features against novel phish websites as well 
as their partial covering up newly collected, larger in 
size, and more varied in class distribution datasets.  
 
3.5  Future Work 
 
Based on the aforesaid observations, this sub-section 
gives an insight on facets to be considered for future 
research: 
 
i. Exploring and employing new phishing features 
can possibly yield valuable information to detect 
novel variants of phishes used by the phishers to 
bypass the existing anti-phishing campaign. Also, 
they will provide significant drive to the Internet 
phishing mitigation. 
ii. Highly contributing features are extracted from 
the website content, such as the functional 
components, objects, elements, native functions 
of scripting language. These features are highly 
expected to be exploited by the phishers due to 
their functionalities in modification, imitation, 
redirection and injection of codes and links 
towards obtaining the user’s confidential 
information. Furthermore, they could be assigned 
to more than one type of novel phishes. 
iii. It is observed that the use of hybrid features in 
Group 4, could improve the detection accuracy 
against the novel phishes. Features of Group 4 
perfectly indicate the effects of hybrid features 
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on increasing the phishness prediction accuracy 
due to the reduced overlap and increased 
assignment of the hybrid features to more than 
one pattern of novel phish.    
iv. The major issue that should be considered in using 
the hybrid features is the computational time and 
cost. Through the machine learning algorithms or 
classifiers, the use of 58 hybrid features may have 
negative impacts on the time and execution 
during extraction, training and testing over large 
data sets. 
v. Another issue that should be considered is that 
phishness prediction using a classifier like SVM 
mainly depends on the web content quality and 
quantity of the collected data set. More precisely, 
the websites used for the training on the classifier 
could represent the deceptive features exploited 
in either collected phish or suspicious websites. 
Thus, the data set may affect the accuracy of 
classifier and thereby, the results of the novel 
phishness prediction.   
vi. To avoid negative impacts caused by the 
dimension of features space (58 hybrid features), 
further improvements are needed to reduce the 
dimension of features space as well as the 
complexity and time of phishness prediction over 
a large data set in real life application. 
vii. The above-mentioned empirical features 
assessment approach yields that all extracted 
hybrid features can be adopted for the novel 
phishness prediction, which is the major trend of 
the current research trend. But some of these 
features may have negative impacts on the 
overall detection, including the computational 
cost, specificity and sensitivity, due to their 
difference in significance. Thus, further evaluation 
is needed to identify the optimal combination of 
these features and obtain a set of potential 
features that are hard to exploit by the phishers 
for bypassing the existing anti-phishing campaign.  
 
Overall, they principal inductive factor of a 
classification based detection method is the features 
in use. Moreover, to optimize the classification based 
detection method for novel phish website detection, 
both holistic characterization on phishing deceptions 
and accurate classification on novel phish patterns 
are the most striking merits that should be considered 
carefully. To attain these merits, novel, hybrid, and 
discriminative features are required to explore and 
assess frequently.  
As such, the detection method could yield 
effective performance in the real time experience. To 
this end, we believe that our proposed features as 
demonstrated experimentally are promising to extend 
and optimize those classification based detection 
methods of limited detection scope. Furthermore, the 
introduced criteria could promote the assessment and 
the selection of the most discriminative features from 
a large scale space of hybrid features testified 
herewith experimentally. Consequently, a phishing 
filtering engine could be upgraded in terms of its 
inductive parameters and its performance toe 
configure resilient defense against evolving phishes.   
 
 
4.0   CONCLUSIONS  
 
One of the main motivations behind conducting this 
work, was to introduce new features (58 features) for 
more holistic characterization of phish website 
patterns and more accurate classification of the novel 
ones. Other motivation was to investigate the causality 
between the proposed features (as the primary 
inductive factors) and the performance of 
classification based detection method. All 
experimentations, assessments and their relevant 
findings gave a proof-check of features’ contributions 
to phishing classification due to their high exploitations 
on phish websites and their prediction susceptibility on 
novel phish websites.  
Accordingly, the proposed features are 
recommended as promising factors to extend the 
limited scope of the currently available phishing filters 
and improve their performance with minimal 
misclassification error on novel phish websites. On the 
other hand, pursuing the introduced assessment 
criteria could also promote the detection strategy with 
the perspective of features selection. They could 
produce the most discriminative compactness of 
features for more accurate classification results. Based 
on the presented findings, it was found that the 
hybridization of features of multiple categories would 
complement their contributions on effective phishing 
classification. Moreover, it was revealed that features 
varied in their discriminating power on phishing 
classification as well as their diversity in phishing 
frequent exploitations. Such observation gives a 
global view on two important facets: (i) hybrid 
features provide holistic description of phish websites 
that crafted in different types of features and then 
minimize the rate of false detections, (ii) selecting the 
most discriminative features is merely significant to 
obtain more accurate detection results and to 
minimize false detections, and (iii) exploring new 
features frequently is essential to obtain effective 
detection outcomes and thwarting novel phish 
websites.  
Thus, further improvements can be made to select 
the most contributing features and discarding the 
least contributing ones with the aid of feature 
selection method for more efficient anti-phishing 
technique.  
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Appendix A 
 
Appendix A Extracted hybrid features with their relevant indexes and groups 
 
Group (1): embedded objects features Group (2): XSS features 
Index Feature Index Feature 
F1 Number of Scripting.FileSystemObject F24 Number <input> in java scripts 
F2 Number of Excel.Application F25 JavaScript scripts length 
F3 Presence of WScript.shell F26 Number of functions’ calls in java scripts 
F4 Presence of Adodb.Stream F27 Number of script lines in java scripts 
F5 Presence of Microsoft.XMLDOM F28 Script line length in java scripts 
F6 Number of <embed> F29 Existence of long variables in JS 
F7 Number of <applet> F30 Existence of long function in JS  
F8 Number of Word.Application F31 Number of fromCharCode() 
F9 link length in <embed> F32 Number attachEvent() 
F10 Number of <iframe> F33 Number of eval() 
F11 Number of <frame> F34 Number of escap() 
F12 Out-of-place tags F35 Number of dispacthEvent() 
F13 Number of <form>  F36 Number of SetTimeout() 
F14 Number <input>  F37 Number of exec() 
F15 Number of MSXML2.XMLHTTP F38 Number of pop() 
F16 Frequent <head>, <title>, <body>  F39 Number of replaceNode() 
F17 <meta index.php?Sp1=> F40 Number of onerror() 
F18 “Codebase” attribute in <object>  F41 Number of onload() 
F19 “Codebase” attribute in <applet> F42 Number of onunload() 
F20 “href” attribute of <link> F43 Number of <script> 
F21 Number of void links in <form> F44 frequent<div onClick=window.open()”> 
F22 Number of out links F47 Number of onerror()in javascripts 
F23 Number of <form> in java scripts F48 Number of SetInterval() 
Group (3): Language independent features  
Index Feature 
F49 Multiple TLD 
F50 Brandname in hostname  
F51 Special symbols in URL 
F52 Coded URL 
F53 IP address instead of domain name 
F54 Typos in Base name 
F55 Long domain name 
F56 Misleading subdomain 
F57 Number of dots in URL 
F58 Path domain length 
 
